September 14, 2021

Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation And State Capacity

Filed under: Uncategorized — dpk3000 @ 5:14 am

Negotiations on the peace agreement are taking place amid uncertainty about the signatories` obligation to abide by the terms of the agreement. That is why the launch and successful implementation of an agreement depends mainly on mutual trust and reciprocity between the signatories. In some cases, the promise of a strong third-party presence confirms the signatories` commitment to a peace agreement (Walter 2002); Fortna 2004). However, such a promise does not always lead to success, as the 2015 South Sudan peace agreement shows. In most cases, implementation is only carried out if signatories remain committed to the process and participate in activities that promote mutual trust and trust (Joshi, Lee and Mac Ginty 2017). The violence of both parties to the agreement undermines efforts to build the mutual trust necessary for the implementation phase. If mutual distrust is strong, neither party can continue to implement the agreement. The State, rebel groups and other armed actors are also vulnerable to unilateral violence, but the effects of unilateral violence on peace processes remain unexplored in the existing literature. In cases of unilateral violence, armed actors do not clash directly; Instead, they target civilians.

Since some civilian partisans voluntarily provide material support (e.g. B accommodation, food, etc.) to armed actors, including the armed forces of the State, the use of unilateral force indicates the intention of the offender to sabotage the peace. The use of unilateral force also indicates the uncertain commitment of the offender to peace, as this violence hinders the implementation process by creating new reasons for disagreement and mistrust. Empirical studies of the peace process do not clearly show whether the use of unilateral force undermines the implementation of the peace agreement or leads to derailment. Nor do they show whether the identity of the culprits – the state, rebels or other non-state actors – alters the impact of unilateral violence on implementation. In the next section, I develop a theoretical argument about the use of unilateral force by armed actors and the implementation of agreements, focusing on mutual learning and reputation building in the midst of the challenges of the agreement. Joshi, M and Quinn, JM. 2017. Peace implementation: comprehensive implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and duration of peace after internal armed conflicts. British Journal of Political Science, 47(4): 869-92.

DOI: doi.org/10.1017/S0007123415000381 Since the end of the Second World War, 231 internal armed conflicts have been fought (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen, 2006). Between 1945 and 1999, an average of 2.3 civil wars broke out each year worldwide, while during the same period, only 1.85 civil wars ended (cited by Fearon, 2004). Negotiated peace agreements ended 12 per cent of these internal conflicts, while 54 per cent were resolved by military victories during the Cold War. The landscape of global conflict changed dramatically after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Lounsbery and DeRouen Jr., 2018), with national peace agreements having increased fivefold worldwide after the Cold War (Badran, 2014). Interestingly, the peace agreements have raised conflicts over power-sharing within the government, unlike controversial territorial disputes (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen, 2006). Mason, T. David &Greig, J. Michael, “State capacity, regime type, and sustaining the peace after civil war,” International Interactions, Vol. 43, no. 6 (2017): 967-993.

An example is the implementation process following the Lusaka Protocol, negotiated in November 1994 between the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Angolan Government. During the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol, the rebels, and then the state, used unilateral force as a strategy to influence the outcome of its implementation. As a result, the process of demobilization of UNITA combatants took much longer than usual. . . .